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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Brody K. Greenwald1 and Jennifer A. Ivers2 wrote Addressing Corruption Allegations in 
International Arbitration to provide a comprehensive overview of the key corruption issues that 
arise in international arbitration.3 The authors guide the reader through six chapters all of which 
can be divided into three arcs representing issues that arise before, during, and after corruption 
has been alleged. This review works though each individual chapter in detail. The first three 
chapters make up the first arc and provide a well-written and insightful background as to what 
corruption is, the requirements for establishing it, and the burdens and standards of proof that are 
used in tribunal and court decisions.4 The fourth chapter starts the second arc and dives into the 
role that corruption plays in real-life practice while citing to several major international cases 
which have been affected by corruption.5 The last two chapters form the third arc and examine 
the legal consequences and other issues that can arise after a case has been affected by 
corruption.6  
Although a very instructive piece of literature, this book falls apart at the seams halfway 
through.7 Chapters one through four are relevant, organized, and informative, while chapters five 
and six are extraneous, disorganized, and poorly written.8 Though the authors intend to organize 
the book into chronological arcs, it instead naturally falls into two halves. 9 The split between the 
 
* Ginger Snapp is the Editor-in-Chief of the Arbitration Law Review and a 2022 Juris Doctor Candidate at The 
Pennsylvania State University School of Law.  
 
1 Brody K. Greenwald is a partner in the International Arbitration practice at White & Case LLP and represents 
clients in high-stakes, complex international disputes arising under bilateral investment treaties. 
 
2 Jennifer A. Ivers is an Attorney-Advisor in the Office of the General Counsel at the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, and previously was an associate in the International Arbitration practice at White & Case LLP where 
she represented clients in investment treaty arbitrations.  
 
3 BRODY K. GREENWALD & JENNIFER A. IVERS, Addressing Corruption Allegations in International Arbitration 
(Koninklijke Brill NV eds., BRILL RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 2018).  
 
4 Id. at 2.  
 
5 Id.  
 
6 Id. at 3.  
 
7 Id. at 50-83.  
 
8 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 1-84. 
 
9 Id. at. 2-15, 38-49, 50-75.  
 
 224 
first and second half of the book is so readily apparent that it reads like two separate pieces of 
work. It appears the authors either ran out of energy and time or did not collaborate when 
deciding on structure, content, and citations. The second half of the book is repetitive, lacks any 
coherent main points, and misses several significant arguments.10 Further, the citations in the 
second half significantly falter both in the lack thereof and accuracy.11 While the opening part of 
this book is a praiseworthy resource guide accessible to even lay readers, the latter portion is an 
unorganized disarray of arbitrary facts.  
 
II.  DESPITE LONGSTANDING EFFORTS TO COMBAT CORRUPTION, IT REMAINS ENDEMIC IN 
MUCH OF THE WORLD 
 
 Chapter one begins the first arc of the book and sets the groundwork for the rest of the 
chapters by providing an informative background about what corruption is and how it affects all 
people.12 Any person could pick up this guide, read this chapter, and have a basic and well-
informed idea of corruption and its role in the modern world. The content of this chapter makes it 
clear that allegations of corruption will likely continue as a crucial issue for international 
arbitration disputes despite preventative practices.13  
 The book defines corruption as “the misuse of a public or private position for direct or 
indirect personal gain.”14 Additionally, corruption encompasses crimes such as bribery, insider 
dealing, influence-peddling, abuse of power, nepotism, revolving doors between the private and 
public sectors, and conflicts of interest.15 Corruption undermines democracy and the rule of law, 
leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life for all people, and 
allows organized crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish.16  
 In 1977, the United States passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), and 
became the first country to enact major legislation prohibiting the bribery of foreign public 
officials.17 In 1996, the member States of the Organization of American States, minus Cuba, 
followed suit and enacted the Inter-American Convention against Corruption.18 Since the passage 
of these pioneer prohibitions, nearly every state across the globe has ratified one or more similar 
international anticorruption conventions.19 Further, most, if not all, countries have criminalized 
 
10 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 50-83.  
 
11 Id.  
 
12 Id. at 3-8.  
 
13 Id. at 9.  
 
14 Id. at 3. 
 
15 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 3. 
 
16 Id. at 6 (citing to G.A. Res. 58/4, ¶ 1 (Dec. 14, 2005). 
 
17 Id. at 4 (“[T]he FCPA also prescribes civil and criminal penalties for knowingly falsifying books and records or 
circumventing or failing to implement an adequate system of internal accounting controls . . . .”).  
 
18 Id.  
 
19 Id. at 4.  
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corruption because it is contrary to international public policy.20 
 Despite the substantial efforts of many states and international organizations to stamp out 
corruption, bribes are still routinely demanded and paid.21 In 2017, Transparency International 
reported that nearly one in four people stated that they had paid a bribe within the past year.22 
Similarly, the World Bank found that businesses and individuals pay more than US $1 trillion 
combined in bribes every year.23  
 After the author explains the factual background as presented above, the remainder of this 
chapter and the subsequent chapters begin to shift their focus from corruption in general to 
bribery alone. Bribery is only one of the seven types of corruption explicitly mentioned in this 
chapter, yet it becomes the sole focus for the rest of the book, while the other above-mentioned 
types of corruption are never again discussed.24 The authors treat the terms “corruption” and 
“bribery” as synonyms; however, the two words have different meanings. According to Black’s 
Law Dictionary, bribery is “the corrupt payment, receipt, or solicitation of a private favor for 
official action” while corruption is “an impairment of integrity, virtue, or moral principle.”25 
If the authors intended to write a book on bribery, the title and chapter headings should 
have indicated so instead of misleading readers. A more comprehensive guide to corruption 
would have included examples and definitions of all the types of corruption, instead of focusing 
exclusively on bribery. One reason the authors may have chosen to direct their focus towards 
bribery is because it is the most prevalent form of corruption in international arbitration.26 
However, this distinction was not made and subsequently, the reader is misled.    
 
III.  THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING CORRUPTION 
 
While chapter two is an instructive and well-structured portion of an overall useful book, 
it seems to have missed the mark at accomplishing what its title claims to accomplish. The 
authors not only disregard all other types of corruption, they further narrow their scope by 
focusing only on the tip of the corruption iceberg, missing out on the opportunity to delve into 
the root cause of corruption, which is the virtually unlimited discretion that the arbitrator 
retains.27 Chapter two is supposed to describe the requirements to establish corruption, but it 
 
20 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 7. 
 
21 Id. at 8.  
 
22 Id. at 8 (“[T]ransparency International reported bribery rates of 20% in accession countries, 23% in sub-Saharan 
Africa, 28% in Asia Pacific, 29% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 30% in the Middle East and North Africa, 
and 30% in the Commonwealth of Independent States . . . .”).  
 
23 Id. at 8 (citing to S.C. Res. 13493 (Sept. 10, 2018)).  
 
24 Id. at 3. (“[T]he other forms of corruption are: insider dealing, influence-peddling, abuse of power, nepotism, 
revolving doors between the private and public sectors, and conflicts of interest . . . .”).  
 
25 Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
 




instead repeats the issue referenced in the last chapter, and explains the requirements to establish 
bribery.28 
The chapter begins by diving right into the mandatory elements of corruption. According 
to arbitral tribunals considering similar definitions of corruption, there are three requirements to 
establish corruption: (i) the promise, offer, or giving of something of value; (ii) intended for a 
public official or another person or entity; (iii) in order for that official to take or refrain from 
taking official action.29 Because of the three-fold requirement, corruption is notoriously difficult 
to establish. Further, there is typically little or no physical evidence because the parties involved 
use evasive means to ensure no trail of their wrongdoing, making corruption even more difficult 
to prove.30  
After the authors give a general explanation of how to establish what they claim to be 
corruption, but what is in actuality bribery, they then go on to state several noteworthy 
observations. Firstly, a bribe does not need to be cash or some tangible form, it may be anything 
of value.31 Next, a crime is committed upon the offer or promise to give a bribe regardless of 
when or whether a payment is ever made.32 Also, bribes may be negotiated and paid indirectly, 
meaning that the person offering the bribe does not need to know the identity of the ultimate 
beneficiary.33 Similarly, it is unlawful to offer or give a bribe to a public official even if he or she 
is not in a position of power or authority to accept the specific bribe at issue.34  However, other 
courts and tribunals have dismissed allegations of bribery when a so-called public official did not 
actually have the authority by law to take or refrain from taking the bribe in question.35 
Furthermore, the foreign public official does not need to benefit directly from the bribe so long 
as the beneficiary is “another person or entity.”36 Lastly, bribery has an element of criminal 
intent, or mens rea, because bribery must be committed intentionally, willfully, knowingly with a 
“bad purpose,” or with a conscious disregard.37   
An additional noteworthy observation that the authors failed to include is what breeds 
 
27 Inna Uchkunova, Arbitral, Not Arbitrary – Part I: Limits to Arbitral Discretion in ICSID Arbitration, KLUWER 
Arbitration Blog  (Jan. 29, 2013), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2013/01/29/arbitral-not-arbitrary-part-
i-limits-to-arbitral-discretion-in-icsid-arbitration/.  
 
28 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 3-8, 10.  
 
29 Id. at 9-10. 
 
30 Id. at 18. 
 
31 Id. at 10. 
 
32 Id.  
 
33 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 10.  
 
34 Id. at 10. 
 
35 Id. at 14.  
 
36 Id. at 11 (citing to G.A. Res. 58/4, (Dec. 14, 2005)).  
 
37 Id. at 14.  
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corruption, which is the amount of discretion that an arbitrator retains.38 Because arbitrators have 
nearly unlimited discretion with regards to case outcomes, parties are likely to bribe or engage in 
other corrupt practices in order to receive a favorable outcome.39 Exact definitions of arbitrator 
discretion are rare, so as not to limit the arbitrator’s powers.40 Further, an arbitrator’s decision is 
final and legally binding, granting the arbitrator nearly absolute power over the parties.41 Though 
the explanations and descriptions summarized above are straight-forward and accurate, the scope 
is far too narrow. The authors focus solely on bribery when there is a plethora of other forms of 
corruption and even more importantly, key points like the root cause of corruption, that need to 
be pursued.  
 
IV.  THE BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF FOR ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION 
  
 In contrast to the earlier, more organized and more accessible chapters, the reader must 
read much more carefully to dissect chapter three. The reason this chapter is so difficult to sort 
through is because the authors provided an excessive number of confusingly worded 
subheadings.42 Unfortunately, the subheadings, which should be aimed at making the chapter 
easier to follow, actually make it even more difficult to understand. Additionally, this chapter 
was one of the longest chapters within the book for no apparent reason other than to emphasize 
the importance of burdens and standards of proof in arbitration.43  
 Like the previous two chapters, chapter three also begins with a set of definitions to 
provide some background for the reader. The burden of proof is defined as “the legal burden 
borne by the party that must persuade the tribunal in order to prevail on its entire case or a 
particular issue.”44 The standard of proof is defined as “the amount of evidence needed to 
establish either an individual issue or the party’s case as a whole.”45 
The burden of proof lies with the party alleging the corruption, whether it is the claimant 
 
38 Uchkunova, supra note 27.  
 




41 Id.  
 
42 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 15-34 (The subheadings in this chapter of the book are: “The Burden of Proof is on 
the Party Alleging Corruption,” “Most Courts and Tribunals Require More Compelling Evidence to Prove 
Corruption and Fraud,” “The Standard of Proof Applied by National Courts,” “The Standard of Proof Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals,” “Corruption May Be Proved through Circumstantial (Rather than Direct) 
Evidence,” and “Tribunals Have the Power to Draw Adverse Inferences against Either Party for Failing to Produce 
Evidence.”).  
 
43 Id. at 15-37. 
 
44 Id. at 15. 
 
45 Id. at 20. 
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or the respondent.46 The opposing party has no legal burden to disprove the allegation.47 Several 
tribunals have ruled that if a party adduces some evidence which supports their allegation of 
corruption, the burden of proof now shifts to the opponent.48 While some courts support a  
shifting burden in corruption cases, other courts, and the authors of this book, are firmly against 
it.49  
 The authors describe a shifting burden as problematic for several reasons. First, 
arbitration is neither an interrogative system where the court establishes the facts, nor a system 
where the case relies on one party to rebut another party’s argument.50 Second, there are serious 
due process concerns with requiring the accused party to prove it did nothing wrong, because this 
is incompatible with the right to a fair trial.51 Due process means that each party is entitled to fair 
treatment.52 A shifting burden completely undermines fair treatment because it changes the 
judicial process, and its rules as a whole, by moving the burden from the party best able to carry 
it to the party not equally equipped.53 Requiring a party to prove the absence of corruption would 
be proving a negative, which is logically impossible.54 Third, the burden of proof is a persuasive 
burden that requires the party bearing the burden to prove their particular issue, or lose on the 
issue in question.55 This means that if the party successfully proves corruption, then they have 
won the issue and shifting the burden uproots the persuasive burden requirement of arbitration 
tribunals.56   
 After the burden of proof has been thoroughly discussed, the authors move on to the 
standard of proof as used in investment arbitral proceedings. As similarly stated above, the 
standard of proof is the level of proof needed in a case, which is established by assessing all 
evidence.57 Courts and tribunals differ as to the applicable standard of proof, although the 
majority require more compelling evidence to prove corruption.58  
 
46 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 15-16.  
 




49 Id. at 16-17. For example, the ICSID tribunals in AAPL v. Sri Lanka and Karkey v. Pakistan were both in favor of 
a shifting burden in certain cases. Despite this, neither of these tribunals actually shifted the burden of proof to the 
party accused of corruption. 
 
50 Id. at 17-18.  
 
51 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 18. 
52 Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
 
53 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 18. 
 
54 Id.   
 
55 Id. at 19.  
 
56 Id.  
 
57 Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
 
58 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 15. 
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 There are five different standards of proof applied by national courts. First, in civil law 
countries, the judge is the trier of fact and is not bound by any strict standards, and therefore is 
free to decide matters based on “inner conviction.”59 Second, in common law countries, the 
standard of proof in civil proceedings is usually “preponderance of the evidence,” which requires 
proof that the facts alleged are more likely true than not.60 Also, in countries based on a common 
law system, the standard of proof in criminal proceedings is the much higher standard of 
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” which requires proof coming as close to certainty as is humanly 
possible.61 The United States further recognizes the “clear and convincing evidence” standard of 
proof that is higher than “preponderance of the evidence” but lower than “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”62 The “clear and convincing evidence” standard requires proof that the facts alleged are 
not merely probable but are in fact highly probable so as to establish a firm belief or conviction 
that the allegations in question are true.63 This standard is used where the individual interests at 
stake are more consequential than the loss of money, or in cases alleging serious illegality such 
as fraud, undue influence, and corruption.64 Lastly, England and Australia apply the “balance of 
probabilities” or the “more probable than not” standard of proof in all civil proceedings, 
regardless of the subject matter at dispute.65 This standard is used because the more improbable 
the event, the stronger the evidence should be.66 Despite using different labels for the standard of 
proof, the U.S., England, and Australia all require more compelling evidence to establish civil 
claims based on allegations of corruption or fraud.67  
 On the other hand, international courts and tribunals typically do not impose any strict 
standard of proof.68 The leading arbitral rules contain substantially identical provisions granting 
broad discretion to tribunals to resolve evidentiary issues.69 Eleven uncited examples are 
provided to show that the majority rule is that “the Arbitral Tribunal shall determine the 
admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of evidence.”70 In the absence of a precise rule 
establishing the standard of proof, tribunals in commercial arbitrations determine the standard 
 
59 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 21.  
 








64 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 21. 
 
65 Id. at 23.  
 
66 Id. at 22.  
 
67 Id. at 24.  
 
68 Id.  
 
69 The most prominent examples are International Bar Association Rules on the Taking of Evidence Article 9.1, 
ICSID Arbitration Rule 34, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rule 27.4. Greenwald, supra note 2, at 24. 
 
70 Id. at 24-25.  
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based on the applicable law, occasionally issuing conflicting decisions on an issue.71 The choice 
of law depends on the tribunal’s determination as to whether the standard of proof is a procedural 
issue, a substantive issue, or subject to some international standard.72 Therefore, arbitrators and 
tribunals are entrusted with a great deal of discretion over how the relevant facts are to be found 
and to be proved.73  
Moreover, for allegations of particular gravity, such as fraud, corruption, or other serious 
illegality, most international courts and tribunals have applied a higher standard of proof.74 The 
authors provide concrete examples of when international courts and tribunals have used three 
different higher standards of proof. The first higher standard of proof is the standard of 
“convinced of comfortable satisfaction.”75 The second higher standard is the American standard 
of “clear and convincing evidence.”76 And the third higher standard is when there is “no room 
for reasonable doubt.”77  
However, a minority of courts take a slightly different approach where the seriousness of 
the allegation does not necessarily mean that the tribunal must apply a heightened standard of 
proof.78  Although some tribunals follow this approach of applying the ordinary standard of 
preponderance of the evidence, their observations are still consistent with the majority view that 
a more rigorous assessment and more compelling evidence are required to find fraud and 
corruption.79 Therefore, in most cases, tribunals will either impose a higher standard of proof or 
will exercise great care and require more compelling evidence to prove allegations of corruption 
and fraud.80  
 Additionally, in cases where direct evidence of a fact is not available, numerous tribunals 
have held that corruption nevertheless may be proven through circumstantial evidence.81 Such 
circumstantial evidence must establish the specific facts alleged, and the mere existence of 
suspicion cannot be equated with proof.82 While corruption may be proven through 
 






74 Id. at 26.  
 
75 Id. at 27.  
 
76 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 27. 
 
77 Id. at 28.  
 
78 Id. at 30 (referencing cases like Rompetrol v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, (May 6, 2013); ECE 
Projektmanagement v. Czech Republic, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013); Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/18 (July 26, 2007) and; Union Fenosa v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/4 (Aug. 31, 2018.).  
 
79 Id. at 30.  
 
80 Id. at 31.  
 
81 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 15, 31. 
 
82 Id. at 33. 
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circumstantial evidence by “connecting the dots,” it is not sufficient to allege generally that an 
entire government or judiciary is corrupt, or that a person or entity acted corruptly in another 
context.83  
 Furthermore, many domestic arbitration acts now authorize courts and tribunals to draw 
adverse inferences against either party for failing to produce evidence if that party has 
possession, custody, or control of the evidence and was ordered to produce it.84 An adverse 
inference is a legal inference, adverse to the concerned party, made from a party's silence or the 
absence of requested evidence.85 One of the most effective sanctions to deter a party from 
concealing evidence is the threat to draw an adverse inference.86  
  Despite starting out as an easy to read book, this chapter takes for granted the lay readers 
in the audience and stops defining legal jargon, leaving it to the readers to do their own outside 
research. Although a difficult chapter to read due to structural organization, this chapter mainly 
provides definitions of basic legal concepts with little to no room for oppositional comments.  
 
V.  FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: PROVING CORRUPTION IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
  
Unlike the previous chapters which provided basic background definitions and 
information regarding corruption, chapter four starts the second arc of the book and examines 
several current arbitration cases affected by corruption. Parties have succeeded in proving 
corruption in only a few investment arbitrations.87 This chapter uses the background provided in 
the previous three chapters to examine real world examples of corruption. The three cases 
highlighted are World Duty Free v. Kenya,88 Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan,89 and Chevron v. 
Ecuador.90 The authors chose to describe these cases in an unclear manner and excruciating 
detail. Only after several read-throughs was it possible for even a practiced reader to understand 
the lengthy run-on sentences and uncover the gist of each case. 
 The first and most infamous case is World Duty Free v. Kenya.91 The World Duty Free 
case was an arbitration proceeding that arose under a contract to build, maintain, and operate 
 
83 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 34.  
 
84 Id. at 36. 
 
85 Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
 
86 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 36.  
 
87 Id. at 38-49. 
 
88 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 38 (citing to World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/7 (Oct. 4, 2006)).  
 
89 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 41 (citing to Metal-Tech Ltd. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/3 (Oct. 4, 2013)).  
 
90 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 44 (citing to Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2018)). 
 
91 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 38 (citing to World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/7 (Oct. 4, 2006)). 
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duty-free complexes at airports in Kenya.92 World Duty Free’s Chairman admitted to paying a 
“personal donation” to the President of Kenya as part of the “consideration” to obtain the 
contract.93 The tribunal concluded that the Chairman’s payment was a bribe to obtain the 
contract with Kenya because the transfer of money was covert, with the intention that it remain 
confidential, and an intrinsic part of the overall transaction, without which no contract would 
have been executed between the parties.94  
 The next case mentioned in the book is Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan.95 Metal-Tech had 
obtained Uzbekistan’s approval to establish a joint venture with two State-owned entities.96 At 
the hearing, Metal-Tech’s chairman and CEO testified that Metal-Tech had paid approximately 
US $4,000,000 to three alleged consultants who included the brother of the Prime Minister of 
Uzbekistan and a former government official.97 The tribunal concluded that Metal-Tech’s 
payments made to the consultants raised several “red flags” of corruption.98 The biggest red flag 
raised was that Metal-Tech could provide no evidence of the consultant’s services, because there 
were no legitimate services at the time of the investment.99  
 The Metal-Tech tribunal created a rule beneficial for future arbitration tribunals to use by 
identifying a number of “red flags” of corruption that, while not conclusive, are indeed warning 
signs that need to be taken seriously and investigated.100 Common red flags of corruption 
include, among other things, when a consultant or other intermediary: (i) has a close personal, 
familial, or professional relationship with a key government decision-maker; (ii) shows up 
shortly before government action is to be taken; (iii) claims to know the right people to obtain 
the desired government action; (iv) lacks experience in the particular sector; (v) requires urgent 
or unusually high payments or commissions; (vi) requests to be paid in cash or through a third 
person or entity; (vii) provides unspecified services; and (viii) does not reside or have a 
significant business presence in the country where the project is located.101 These red flags 
would have been valuable if they were described earlier in the book, when the other requirements 
for corruption were explained, but the authors likely included it here to emphasize the relevance 
of the case.  
 




94 Id. at 39. 
 
95 Id. at 41 (citing to Metal-Tech Ltd. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3 (Oct. 4, 2013)).  
 
96 Id.  
 
97 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 41. 
98 Id. at 42. 
 
99 Id. at 41. 
 
100 Id. at 42. 
 
101 Id.  
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 The last and most recent case is Chevron v. Ecuador.102 Chevron concerned a judgement 
by one of Ecuador’s courts, which had ordered Chevron to pay US $18,200,000,000 in 
damages.103 The tribunal in this case relied solely on circumstantial evidence and, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, concluded that the plaintiffs’ representatives had corruptly 
ghostwritten at least material parts of the court’s prior judgement by promising bribes to the 
judge.104  
These three examples show that most of the investment arbitration cases where 
corruption was proven were based on damning admissions made by the party found to have paid 
the bribes.105 So while rare, several investment arbitration proceedings have successfully 
established the existence of arbitral corruption.106 Though other similar cases were mentioned 
throughout this chapter, their presence only distracted the reader from the main points drawn 
from the three important cases. Despite the aforementioned surplus of corruption plaguing 
international investment arbitration, only three of these cases have proven corruption, furthering 
the author’s strong conclusion that corruption is very difficult to prove.107   
 
VI.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
 
Chapter five starts the third arc of the book by moving the topics of discussion from 
events that occur during and before a corrupt act has occurred, to events that occur after that 
corruption has been recognized. Although this portion of the book discusses additional issues 
caused by corruption, it once again misleads the readers and misses some crucial points by 
failing to touch on the actual consequences that someone might face if they are found guilty of 
corrupt practices.108 The authors focus mostly on consequences of corruption on the arbitration 
process as a whole, not the individuals guilty of corrupt practices.109 Further, much of this 
chapter is incoherent and the important information is not readily available. On top of that, the 
 
102 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 44 (citing to Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, 




104 Id. at 49. 
 
105 Id. at 38. 
 
106 Id. at 49. 
 
107 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 8 (“[N]early one in four people stated that they had paid a bribe within the past year” 
and “[b]usinesses and individuals pay more than US $1 trillion combined in bribes every year . . . .”). 
 
108 Id. at 50-72 (The subheadings used in this chapter are “Retaliating against and Causing Damage to an Investor for 
Corrupt Reasons Would Violate the State’s Obligation to Accord Fair and Equitable Treatment,” “Claims Arising 
out of Contracts Procured through Corruption or Concluded for Purposes of Paying Bribes Would be Dismissed,” 
“Investments Made through Corruption Would Not Be Protected under Any Treaty and Would Not Give Rise to 
Valid Claims,” and “Post-investment Corruption May Have Consequences for the Merits of Quantum of the 
Claims”).  
 
109 Id. at 50-74. 
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chapter lacks effective citations.110 As a whole, this chapter is the least well-written portion of 
the entire book. 
Chapter five begins by reemphasizing the seriousness of corruption in arbitration.111 
Corruption of a state officer or arbitrator by bribery or any other form of corruption is 
synonymous with the most heinous crimes because it can cause massive economic damage.112 
Therefore, if an arbitrator, party, or state official is found guilty of corruption, the consequences 
are likely to be severe.113 After the authors stress the harmfulness of arbitral corruption, they 
present four consequences of corruption.114 However, these consequences are not concrete 
punishments for wrongdoing, as one might expect when they think of the word “consequence.” 
Instead, the consequences presented by the authors are actually consequent concerns or issues 
that corruption itself may cause or create.  
 The first consequence underscored in this chapter describes the supplementary costs that 
befall a state if they violate the obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment by retaliating 
against and causing damage to an investor for corrupt reasons.115 A number of claimants in 
investment arbitration have alleged that state officials solicited bribes then retaliated against 
investors for failing to comply with the demand.116 One such case that the authors mention to 
drive home this point is the previously cited case of Chevron.117 After it was decided that corrupt 
practices were used in Chevron, the judgment of the case was immediately annulled.118 The State 
was required to return any proceeds gained, and other corrective measures were implemented to 
re-establish the situation which would have existed if those internationally wrongful acts had not 
been committed. 119 Although not explained by the authors, independent research reveals that 
similar to the tribunal in Chevron, other courts have held that if an arbitrator or public official 
acting on behalf of the State is found guilty of accepting a bribe, he or she may face a 
suspension, civil and criminal fines, imprisonment, injunctions, forfeiture of assets, and/or 
disgorgement of profits.120 
 The second consequence discussed by the authors is that in both commercial and 
 
110 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 50-74. 
 
111 Id. at 6, 50-73. 
 
112 Id. at 60. 
 
113 Id. at 60. 
 
114 Id. at 50.  
 
115 Greenwald, supra note 2, at 50. 
 
116 Id. (“[H]owever, most of these claimants have failed to meet their burden of proof . . . .”). 
 
117 Id. at 44. 
 
118 Id. at 52.  
 
119 Id.  
 




investment arbitrations, tribunals have consistently held that contracts to pay bribes are void, and 
that contracts procured through corruption are, at a minimum, voidable121 because they do not 
give rise to valid claims.122 This section cites back to World Duty Free v. Kenya to make the 
point that when a contract formed based off of a bribe is annulled, any and all awards must be set 
aside, and both parties are ordered to bear their own costs of arbitration.123  
 The third consequence emphasized is that investments made through corruption would 
not be protected under any treaty.124 To strengthen this idea, the authors point back to Metal-
Tech v. Uzbekistan. Many investment treaties, including the one in Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan, 
contain clauses providing that the investor must invest in compliance with international law in 
order to benefit from the treaty’s protections.125 Otherwise, the tribunal may refuse jurisdiction 
because there is a lack of consent to arbitrate.126 The authors are seemingly trying to make the 
argument that corrupt investments are inherently invalid. They have chosen only to describe 
obvious effects of corruption on the arbitral process instead of researching concrete civil and 
criminal punishments that a party or arbitrator may face if they are found guilty of certain corrupt 
behaviors.127 
 The fourth and final consequence stressed by the authors is that “post-investment 
corruption, fraud, or illegality may have consequences for the merits of the claims, or the amount 
of compensation awarded but will not result in a lack of jurisdiction or in the admissibility of the 
claims.”128 There is little to no explanation of what the authors meant by this statement and 
virtually no clarification on what “future claims” the authors may be referencing. Moreover, the 
authors do not create a new consequence of corruption but reiterate the previous points made.129 
This section would have been another ideal location for the authors to discuss personal and 
individual consequences of international corruption but instead they again focus only on how the 
arbitration as a whole is affected by corruption. 
Although this chapter found a roundabout way to describe some consequences associated 
with the heinous crimes of corruption, it missed the mark by taking a narrow, indirect pathway. 
The authors chose to point their focus towards problems caused by corruption. But the actual 
tangible penalties that one might face from partaking in corrupt practices are missing from this 
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analysis in the book.130 Throughout the book, and this chapter especially, the authors harp on the 
dangerous and rampant ways of corruption yet the actual consequences and standard 
punishments for these grave crimes are vaguely described.131 
 
VII.  OBJECTIONS BASED ON ATTRIBUTION AND ESTOPPEL WHERE THE STATE DOES NOT  
PROSECUTE THE ALLEGED CORRUPTION 
 
 The final chapter falls prey to the same confusing headings, rambling sentences, and 
immaterial substance matter as the previous two chapters. 132 The preceding chapter delves into 
the consequences when a party is guilty of corruption.133 The apparent aim of chapter six is to 
describe the consequences when the state, another party, or the arbitrator is aware of corruption 
but does not report it. While this is an important subject to touch on, it could have been included 
in the previous chapter as an additional consequence. It is unclear why this specific issue is 
important enough that the authors chose to create an entirely separate chapter to focus on it. 
Furthermore, the authors fail to explain what happens to an arbitrator or party when they fail to 
report corruption. 
As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, arbitrators, the state, and parties can all be 
guilty of corrupt practices.134 Despite this fact, the non-state associated parties seem to face the 
greatest punishments while the state officials and arbitrators get off with only minor 
reprimands.135 Many people find issue with this discrepancy, resulting in a push by arbitral 
institutions for government officials and arbitrators to be more severely punished for their 
wrongful conduct.136 The push for equal punishments among arbitral parties is backed by issues 
of attribution and estoppel.137     
With regard to attribution, bribery is a bilateral act that by its very nature involves the 
participation of both the parties, state or non-state, and the arbitrator.138 Next, a state or arbitrator 
should be estopped from raising corruption as a defense to any post-arbitration issues if it failed 
to prosecute the alleged wrongdoers in its domestic courts.139 A state or arbitrator’s failure to 
report on corruption could permit inferring that they were just as knowledgeable and guilty as the 
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other corrupt parties involved.140 However, no tribunal in an investment arbitration has prevented 
a party from raising a corruption defense due to its failure to bring criminal charges in domestic 
courts.141 Although a party’s failure to prosecute will not preclude it from raising a corruption 
defense in arbitration, the tribunal may consider it when assessing the evidence of the alleged 
corruption and when awarding costs.142    
Despite arbitration institutions’ push for equal punishments between parties to arbitration, 
some arbitration experts still hold steadfast to the leniency of punishments for arbitrators and 
government parties.143 While harsher consequences for the investors may seem unfair, their 
payment of bribes violates both host state law and international public policy.144 Such investors 
have thus forfeited their right to seek justice before courts and tribunals and have no basis to 
complain about the consequences of their illicit activities.145  
The authors end the sixth and final chapter before taking the opportunity to delve deeper 
into the actual punishments or penalties that a state official or arbitrator may face if they fail to 
report corrupt practices. Outside research reveals that if and when an arbitrator fails to address 
known corruption, most arbitral rules allow a party to move to remove an arbitrator for 
impropriety.146Although there are systems that may help a party deal with an immediate instance 
of corruption, there are no long lasting or perfect plans in place to discourage corruption in the 
system overall.147 A potential solution that has been discussed amongst arbitration scholars is 
modification of the arbitral rules to allow for challenges against arbitrators specifically on 
corruption grounds, and requiring arbitrators to base their decisions on objective fact, rather than 
their subjective view.148   
Throughout the final chapter, the authors make a valiant attempt to address the 
inconsistency between consequences faced by parties but ultimately fall short of drawing any 
solid conclusions. The reader is required to do outside research to determine what consequences, 
if any, an arbitrator may face for failing to report corrupt practices. Additionally, this portion of 
the book would be an excellent place for the expert authors to input their opinions on how to 
solve the issue of corruption in investment arbitration, but this route was unfortunately not taken. 
Lastly, the format, structure, and citations used throughout chapter six were entirely different and 
faltered in comparison to the earlier chapters, which set high expectations for the reader.149  
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
This resource guide makes a noble attempt to deliver the main point that corruption 
allegations are now routinely raised in international proceedings for good reason.150 The first 
chapter highlights that despite widespread attempts, corruption still plagues the international 
courts, even though it improperly equates corruption with bribery.151 The second chapter 
explains that the requirements for establishing bribery are specific and straight-forward but still 
hard to prove, and while accurate, the authors create too narrow a scope by limiting their 
complaints to bribery only and excluding other forms of corruption. Further, this chapter would 
create a strong opportunity to stress the relevance of arbitrator discretion and its role in breeding 
other forms of corruption, like bribery.152 The third chapter discusses the burden and standards of 
proof for corruption, which are generally high and on the alleging party. While this chapter is 
one of the strongest chapters substantively, lacking virtually any holes, it loses its readers 
through its unnecessarily lengthy descriptions and excessive and confusing subheadings.153 The 
fourth chapter provides insight into how corruption is rampant, now more than ever, through 
concrete case examples.154 The fifth chapter delves into the consequences faced by the 
arbitrators, parties and/or governmental officials found guilty of corruption. This chapter, 
probably the hardest to decipher, hits on some important post-corruption effects while leaving 
out the major penalties that parties actually face for partaking in corrupt practices.155 The sixth 
chapter delves into a supplementary consequence faced by arbitrators or parties that do not report 
on known corruption. The authors seemed to miss out on an opportunity to explain the role of the 
arbitrator and how he or she may be responsible for preventing or reporting corruption.156 All in 
all, the authors tried diligently to provide an insightful and educational resource guide of 
corruption in arbitration. If the authors would have been more coherent and consistent in their 
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